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This	paper	compares	a	psychological	explanation	of	support	for	a	ban	on	headscarves	in	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	Germany	and	the	Netherlands.	This	
study	examines	how	perceptions	of	threat	posed	by	Muslims	and	Islam	and	the	overall	attitude	towards	Muslims	explain	support	for	a	ban	on	headscarves.	
In	addition,	cross-national	comparisons	are	made	to	study	how	these	relations	are	affected	by	contextual	differences.	Analyses	are	based	on	the	2005	
survey	on	Islamic	extremism	by	the	Pew	Research	Center.	Results	show	that	the	countries	have	a	large	influence	on	whether	someone	supports	the	ban	on	
headscarves,	indicating	that	contextual	differences	matter.	In	addition,	having	a	negative	attitude	towards	Muslims	makes	it	more	likely	to	support	a	ban	
on	headscarves.	In	general,	perceived	threat	contributes	to	stronger	support,	although	there	are	slight	differences	in	effect	between	the	countries.	Finally,	
perceived	threat	equally	influences	support	for	the	ban	on	headscarves	among	prejudiced	and	non-prejudiced	people.
Public Support for a Ban on Headscarves: 
A Cross-National Perspective
Jolanda	van	der	Noll,	Bremen	International	Graduate	School	of	Social	Sciences	(BIGSSS),	Jacobs	University,	
Bremen,	Germany
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion are core 
principles underlying democratic western societies, have 
been central in the development of the constitutions of 
many Western European countries, and have been valued 
within these societies for even longer. Rarely, however, 
have these countries been confronted with the arrival of a 
large number of immigrants who do not share the religious 
background of the majority population (Hunter 2002). The 
growing number of Muslims in Western Europe has gener-
ated renewed interest in the debate on freedom of religion 
and religious practices. This debate is not only limited to 
the individual and private practice of religion, but often 
revolves around questions of religious discrimination and 
the extent to which Muslims or minorities in general, can 
practise their faith within Western societies. The inter-
play between the private and public spheres of religion is, 
for instance, illustrated by controversies that have arisen 
throughout Europe concerning the wearing of headscarves 
by Muslim women. Restricting a minority group in their 
rights and liberties can cause tensions and conflicts between 
groups within a society, such as increased discrimina-
tion, marginalisation and social isolation of Muslims by 
non-Muslims. This, in turn, can result in stronger feelings 
of social exclusion and radicalisation among Muslims. A 
deteriorating relationship between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims would have a great impact on the political and social 
cohesion of western societies and it is important to identify 
the determinants of the willingness to limit the right of 
Muslims to practise their religion. 
In this paper I examine psychological factors that may 
explain support for a ban on headscarves, emphasising the 
individual and the overall attitude towards Muslims, per-
ceived threats posed by Islam and Muslims, and the interac-
tion with cross-national differences. 
My comparison is between the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. These countries have simi-
lar profiles with respect to the position of Muslims in their 
societies: Muslims arrived as immigrants from the 1950s 
mainly as guest workers (later joined by their families) or as 
post-colonial migrants, and Muslims are overrepresented 
in the lower socioeconomic segments of society. Unemploy-
ment rates of immigrants in general, and Muslims in par-
ticular are considerably higher than unemployment rates of 
the overall population. Furthermore, there are large income 
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differences between Muslims and the overall population in 
Western European countries (Buijs and Rath 2006; Pew Re-
search Center 2007; EUMC 2006). Despite the similarities, 
the countries differ in other aspects such as the number of 
Muslims, countries of origin, and the way Muslim minori-
ties and immigrants in general are dealt with, for instance 
with respect to citizenship requirements (Weldon 2006) 
and formal church-state arrangements (Fetzer and Soper 
2005). Exact estimates of the Muslim population in Western 
Europe are difficult to arrive at because most countries do 
not record religious affiliations. 
In France the number of Muslims is generally estimated 
to be between 6 and 9 percent of the population, most of 
whom have an Algerian or Moroccan background (Buijs 
and Rath 2006; Dassetto, Ferrari, and Maréchal 2007). 
French society is characterised by a strict version of secular-
ism (laïcité) and a rigorous separation of state and church 
(Hunter 2002). 
The United Kingdom, in contrast, officially recognizes 
distinct cultural and religious groups, which have equal 
status under the law (Borooah and Mangan 2009). Muslims 
in the United Kingdom mainly have an Asian background 
and come from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Muslims 
are generally estimated to make up less than 3 percent of the 
total population (Dassetto, Ferrari, and Maréchal 2007). 
The Netherlands and Germany can be placed between 
France and the United Kingdom. In both countries the 
number of Muslims is estimated at approximately 5 percent 
of the population. German Muslims have predominantly 
a Turkish background. Immigrants were long perceived as 
temporary and encouraged to maintain their own culture, 
customs and language. With the liberalisation of citizenship 
policies in the 1990s, the emphasis shifted towards similari-
ties, rather than differences (Brubaker 2001). Integration 
policies in the Netherlands were also aimed at empowering 
different ethnic groups and supported, for instance, teach-
ing and broadcasting in minority languages, and the estab-
lishment of religious schools. In contrast to Germany, the 
Dutch aim was to integrate ethnic minorities into society, 
facilitated by a relatively easy naturalisation process, grant-
ing local voting rights to foreigners and anti-discrimination 
legislation that ensured their ability to maintain their own 
culture (Michalowski 2005). In recent years, the focus has 
shifted more towards assimilation, meaning that minori-
ties are expected to adopt the majority’s culture rather than 
maintaining their own.
1. The Headscarf Debate in Western Europe
The wearing of headscarves by Muslim women has become 
one of the central issues in the debate over the position 
of Muslims in Western Europe. This is a complex and 
multifaceted debate and although many Muslim women 
voluntarily choose to wear a headscarf for religious or 
cultural reasons (Bouw et al. 2003; Shadid and Van Kon-
ingsveld 2005), non-Muslims often interpret the heads-
carf as a symbol of oppression of women, patriarchy, and 
rejection of gender equality (EUMC 2006; McGoldrick 
2006). Opponents of the headscarf often argue that Muslim 
women wear a headscarf because they are forced to do so 
by their parents, brothers, husbands or religious leaders 
(Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2005; Saharso and Lettinga 
2008). The headscarf debate also touches on other concerns 
related to Muslim minorities; there is for instance discus-
sion on whether the headscarf is really a requirement of 
the Islamic religion. Given that this is not entirely clear, 
the wearing of the headscarf is perceived as a symbol of 
Islamic fundamentalism, which, in turn, is associated with 
terrorism and violence (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2005; 
McGoldrick 2006). More generally, the headscarf is per-
ceived as a sign of immigrants’ unwillingness to integrate 
into western societies and as a rejection of western values 
(McGoldrick 2006). 
Several European countries have recently implemented 
laws concerning the wearing of headscarves in public places 
(Dassetto, Ferrari, and Maréchal 2007; McGoldrick 2006; 
Saroglou et al. 2009). The best-known example is probably 
the French law of 2004, prohibiting pupils in public schools 
from wearing any ostensible religious signs (Law no. 228, 
March 15, 2004). The main argument for this prohibition 
was that religious symbols, and thus the headscarf, would 
conflict with the secular and neutral character of the repub-
lican state (McGoldrick 2006). The French Republic and its 
laïcité emerged through intense fights against the Catholic 
Church, especially, and the hard-won separation of reli-
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gion and public schooling remains a sensitive issue (Gunn 
2004). Similar legislation has been proposed in Belgium 
and Denmark, but has been rejected (Dassetto, Ferrari, and 
Maréchal 2007). 
In contrast to France, the United Kingdom has a very liberal 
approach to the wearing of religious symbols. In most 
teaching institutions the Islamic headscarf is accepted and 
if conflicts arise, they are generally resolved within the in-
stitution. There is no general legislation that prohibits wom-
en from wearing headscarves, but there are other provisions 
that regulate the issue, for instance, that pupils’ headscarves 
should comply with the school uniform (McGoldrick 2006; 
Molokotos-Liederman 2000). 
In Germany, regulations on the wearing of headscarves in 
public places such as schools are laid down at the level of the 
federal states, which has led to a variety of approaches for 
teachers and other civil servants. Three states (Berlin, Bre-
men and Lower Saxony) follow a secular approach and have 
implemented legislation that prohibits teachers and other 
civil servants from wearing any visible religious symbols 
and clothes. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North 
Rhine–Westphalia and Saarland implemented a more 
conservative Christian approach and only prohibited teach-
ers and civil servants from wearing a headscarf, whereas 
Christian crucifixes, nuns’ habits and the Jewish kippah are 
allowed. The remaining states have not passed explicit regu-
lations on religious clothing. School and university students 
in Germany are generally not restricted in the wearing of 
headscarves (Berghahn 2008; Faas 2010). 
Lastly, in the Netherlands there is a broad ability to live 
according to particular group identities and traditions, 
including in the public sphere. The Dutch Equal Treatment 
Commission generally rules in favour of women who want 
to wear the headscarf, ruling that it is an expression of 
their religious identity, and as such protected by the right 
to freedom of religion. Distinctions are, however, made 
between institutional contexts; for reasons of neutrality, 
religious symbols (including the headscarf) are prohibited 
in courtrooms and the police force, but teachers and pupils 
are allowed to wear headscarves in schools (Saharso and 
Lettinga 2008). 
Although there are differences depending on institutional 
settings and traditions, there seems to be a cross-national 
consensus that face-veiling is undesirable (McGoldrick 
2006; Berghahn 2008). The French parliament recently 
approved a law that prohibits Muslim women from wear-
ing veils that cover their face, like the burqa or the niqab, in 
public. According to President Nicolas Sarkozy, the law is 
intended to protect women from being forced to wear the 
veil (NOS 2010). The lower chamber of the Belgium par-
liament has also voted in favour of a similar ban on face-
covering veils, but this law still has to be approved by the 
senate. In addition to reasons of morality and the oppressed 
position of women, Belgian supporters of this ban focus on 
reasons of public safety; people who cover their face pose a 
security risk (Cendrowicz 2010).
2.  Perceived Threat as an Explanation for 
 Support for a Ban on Headscarves
Studies identify the perception of threat as one of the main 
predictors of the strength of support for the rights and lib-
erties of others (Gibson 2006; McIntosh et al. 1995; Scheep-
ers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Sullivan and Transue 
1999). Integrated Threat Theory suggests four basic types 
of threat that can result in negative attitudes towards out-
groups: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety 
and negative stereotypes (Stephan et al. 1998, 559). Realistic 
threat refers to economic and physical threats, such as com-
petition over material and economic resources and safety 
concerns. Despite the label “realistic”, these threats do not 
have to be “real”; the mere perception of threat can also re-
sult in a negative attitude. Nor does the label imply that oth-
er forms of threat would not be “realistic”. Symbolic threat 
is conceptualised in terms of differences between norms, 
values and belief systems (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006). 
Perceptions, for instance, that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible, or that values Muslims adhere to substan-
tially deviate from what is valued in the West contribute to 
feelings that Islam and Muslims pose a threat to the values 
and belief systems of western societies. Intergroup anxiety 
refers to the fear of being treated negatively in interactions 
with the out-group. Negative stereotypes refer to character-
istics of an out-group that may be perceived as threatening 
for the individual’s well-being (Stephan et al. 1998). Support 
for the rights and liberties of others is a societal issue, rather 
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than a personal one; it is about how society should react to 
minorities who practice their own (religious) customs. 
Public discourse concerning Islam and Muslims in Europe 
has been dominated by associations with violence and ter-
rorism. The Iranian Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Kho-
meini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989, the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Madrid 
in 2004 and London in 2005, and the murder of Theo van 
Gogh by a Muslim fundamentalist in the Netherlands in 
November 2004 have contributed to a perception of Islam 
posing a security threat to western societies (Volpp 2002; 
Oswald 2005; Cashin 2010). In addition, debates about 
Islam and Muslims increasingly focus on whether the world 
views and ways of life of Muslims are compatible with that 
what is valued within western societies. Majorities in France 
(50 percent), the United Kingdom (61 percent), the Nether-
lands (61 percent) and Germany (84 percent) disagreed with 
the statement that the culture of Muslims fits well into their 
country. Conflicting values are perceived in terms of gender 
relations. One widely shared opinion (more than 75 percent 
of the population in West European countries) is that the 
attitude of Muslims towards women contradicts western 
values (Zick and Küpper 2009). 
The Islamic headscarf is often said to stand for Islamic 
extremism and terrorism, rejection of western societies and 
their values, and a general failure of integration (Shadid 
and Van Koningsveld 2005; McGoldrick 2006; Saharso 
and Lettinga 2008). My first hypothesis is that people who 
perceive Islam and Muslims as a greater security threat will 
be more likely to support a ban on headscarves. The second 
hypothesis is that people who perceive Muslims as prefer-
ring to remain distinct from the larger society will be more 
likely to support a ban on headscarves. However, individual 
attitudes and beliefs and the relations between them need 
to be considered in the context in which they are expressed. 
Prevailing ideologies and existing policies on how to 
deal with diversity and historical arrangements between 
religions and the state influence people’s notions on what 
should and should not be supported (Fetzer and Soper 2005; 
Coenders et al. 2008). It is expected that in France, which 
has a strict separation of church and state, support for a 
ban on headscarves will be more widespread, even where 
people have low levels of perceived threat. In contrast, in 
the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in the Nether-
lands and Germany, there is a tradition of multiculturalism 
and religious groups are encouraged to follow their own 
practices. I expect that in these countries there will be more 
opposition towards such a ban, despite possibly higher 
levels of perceived threat.
Traditionally, research on support for rights and liberties 
of others focuses only on those who indicate a negative 
attitude towards others. More general value orientations 
such as universalism or an overall orientation towards civil 
liberties and cultural diversity can lead prejudiced people 
to positive tolerance positions (Sullivan and Transue 1999). 
The assumption in tolerance research is that the question of 
tolerating activities of others is only relevant for those with 
a negative attitude towards the out-group and would not 
apply to those with a favourable attitude (Marcus et al. 1995; 
Vogt 1997). A few studies have shown, however, that even 
when people have a positive attitude towards an out-group, 
they can also be reluctant to support its rights and liberties 
(Saroglou et al. 2009; McIntosh et al. 1995; Van der Noll, 
Poppe, and Verkuyten 2010). Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
(2007) show that emphasizing national identity can elicit 
exclusionary reactions among unprejudiced people. In addi-
tion, a comparison between prejudiced and non-prejudiced 
adolescents in the Netherlands showed that the perception 
of symbolic threat influenced the level of tolerance among 
prejudiced and non-prejudiced respondents alike (Van der 
Noll, Poppe, and Verkuyten 2010). This finding suggests that 
perceptions of threat are important for making tolerance 
judgements – for people with a positive attitude as well as 
for those with a negative attitude. In light of these studies, I 
expect no differences between people with positive or nega-
tive attitudes towards Muslims in the relationship between 
perceived threat and support for a ban on headscarves.
3. Methods
The analyses presented here are based on the 2005 survey 
on Islamic extremism, which was part of the Pew Global 
Attitudes project (Pew Research Center 2005). The Pew 
Research Center is a non-partisan “fact-tank” that pro-
vides information on issues, attitudes and trends that are 
important for America and the world. The Pew Global 
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Attitudes Project measures attitudes towards globalisation, 
democracy, terrorism and the United States in all regions of 
the world (Pew Research Center 2005, 9). The 2005 survey 
on Islamic extremism covers seventeen nations, including 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands. The original sample from each country consisted of 
approximately 750 respondents aged 18 and above. Re-
spondents who indicated that they were Muslim and those 
who did not answer whether they would support a ban on 
headscarves were excluded from the analyses. This resulted 
in sample sizes of 668 (United Kingdom), 722 (France), 710 
(Germany) and 738 (the Netherlands). Data was collected 
via telephone interviews in April and May 2005.1
3.1. Measures
The dependent variable is support for a ban on headscarves 
worn by Muslim women. The question was worded as fol-
lows: “Some countries have decided to ban the wearing of 
headscarves by Muslim women in public places including 
schools. Do you think this is a good idea or a bad idea?” The 
variable is dichotomous, with the answer possibilities “good 
idea” (1) and “bad idea” (0). 
Overall attitude towards Muslims was measured by the 
question: “Please tell me if you have a very favourable, 
somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very 
unfavourable opinion of Muslims?” Answers were rated on 
a four-point scale, recoded into a scale in which 0 represents 
a very favourable opinion, .33 a favourable opinion, .67 an 
unfavourable opinion and 1 a very unfavourable opinion of 
Muslims. With this measurement of the overall opinion of 
Muslims, I follow the one-dimensional conceptualisation of 
an attitude as an overall favourable or unfavourable evalu-
ation (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). An unfavourable overall 
attitude reflects prejudice towards Muslims. Although this 
item could be sensitive to social desirability, it is the only 
possibility offered by the questionnaire, and the results 
show that respondents did not refrain from indicating a 
negative opinion of Muslims. 
Perceptions of threat were measured with several ques-
tions. First of all, to account for the perception that 
Muslims reject western societies and its values (symbolic 
threat), respondents were asked: “Do you think most 
Muslims coming to our country today want to adopt 
[survey country’s] customs and way of life, or do you 
think that they want to be distinct from the larger [survey 
country] society?” This is a dichotomous variable with 
“adopt our ways” (0) and “want to be distinct” (1) as answer 
categories. Strictly speaking, this item does not ask about 
threat; people can perceive that Muslims want to remain 
distinct and have no problem with it, or even encourage 
it. Because the debate on headscarves is often associated 
with a perceived rejection of western societies and values 
by Muslims and thus the desire of Muslims to be distinct 
from the larger society, I expect that this variable will func-
tion as a proxy for perceived symbolic threat. To measure 
perceived security threat, a question elicited concerns 
related to Islamic extremism: “How concerned, if at all, 
are you about the rise of Islamic extremism in our country 
these days? Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, 
not too concerned, or not at all concerned?” The original 
four-point scale was reduced to a three-point scale rang-
ing from 0 to 1, collapsing the “not too concerned” and 
“not at all concerned” categories. A higher score indicates 
more concern. A dummy variable was created indicating 
whether respondents perceived Islam as more violent than 
other religions. Respondents were asked to choose between 
the statements “Some religions are more prone to violence 
than others” or “All religions are about the same when it 
comes to violence”. Respondents who agreed with the first 
statement were subsequently asked which religion they 
perceived as most violent, choosing between Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism and Hinduism. Respondents who indicated 
that “all religions are the same when it comes to violence” 
(45 percent) and who indicated a religion other than Islam 
to be most violent (12.5 percent of those who stated that 
some religions are more prone to violence) were the refer-
ence category (coded 0) compared to those who perceived 
Islam to be more violent (coded 1). 
1 The dataset is available from the website of the 
Pew Global Attitudes project http://pewglobal.org/
category/data-sets/ under May 2005 Survey Data. 
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Background characteristics like gender, age, education and 
income were also collected. These background variables are 
often found to relate to prejudice. A common finding is that 
women, younger people and people with a higher level of 
education and income have generally less negative attitudes 
towards minorities (Chandler and Tsai 2001). The country-
specific scales for education were reduced to one scale of 
low, middle and high level of education. A four-point scale 
was created for income by dividing the country-specific 
income scales into quartiles. 
3.2. Analyses
In the first step of analysis, differences in levels of sup-
port for a ban on headscarves, attitude towards Muslims 
and threat perceptions across countries were identified by 
analysis of variance with Scheffé’s post-hoc comparisons. 
Analysis of variance is preferred in this situation because 
general mean comparisons between the countries would 
inflate the risk of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis (Type 
I error). Scheffé’s post-hoc comparison is among the more 
conservative methods and was used to reveal which coun-
tries differed from each other. The second step was to exam-
ine the bivariate correlations (Spearman’s rho) of support 
for a ban on headscarves and the various predictors and 
to compare these across countries. Lastly, to test whether 
support for a ban on headscarves could be explained by 
attitude towards Muslims and perceptions of threat, logistic 
regression analysis was conducted. To test whether there 
were structural differences in the explanatory model across 
countries, dummy variables were included for the countries, 
and interactions between the countries and the predictor 
variables were tested for their significance. Missing values 
were excluded from the analyses via list-wise deletion. 
4. Results
4.1. Descriptives
A majority of respondents in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands favoured a ban on headscarves in public places 
(Table 1). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a 
majority of 68 percent perceived such a ban to be a bad idea. 
The analysis of variance showed that the level of support 
differed significantly between the four countries, with the 
French respondents being most supportive, followed by the 
German and Dutch, and the British respondents being the 
least supportive (F(3, 2838) = 122.6, p < .001, η2 = .11). These 
results correspond with the expectations based on tradi-
tional relations between church and state: in France there 
is broad support for a neutral and secular public sphere, 
whereas in the United Kingdom there is broad support for 
the presence of different religious and cultural identities 
in the public sphere; Germany and the Netherlands fall 
between these two extremes.
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Table 1: Frequency distributions of dependent and independent variables, by country
UK France Germany Netherlands
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Support	for	ban	on	
	headscarves	
Yes	 213 	 32 	 572 	 79 	 425 	 60 	 380 	 51
No	 455 	 68 	 150 	 21 	 285 	 40 	 358 	 49
Total	 668 	 100 	 725 	 100 	 740 	 100 	 752 	 100
Opinion	of	Muslims		
(overall	attitude)
Very	positive	 117 	 20 	 58 	 8 	 28 	 4 	 33 	 5
Positive	 365 	 63 	 415 	 59 	 289 	 46 	 306 	 43
Negative	 61 	 11 	 158 	 22 	 248 	 40 	 268 	 37
Very	negative	 37 	 6 	 78 	 11 	 65 	 10 	 109 	 15
Total	 580 	 100 	 709 	 100 	 630 	 100 	 716 	 100
Muslims	want	to	remain	
distinct	(symbolic	threat)
Yes	 411 	 76 	 413 	 60 	 611 	 89 	 483 	 68
No	 127 	 24 	 274 	 40 	 73 	 11 	 230 	 32
Total	 538 	 100 	 687 	 100 	 684 	 100 	 713 	 100
Concern	about	extremism	
(security	threat)
No	 201 	 30 	 175 	 24 	 178 	 25 	 170 	 23
Somewhat	 242 	 37 	 322 	 45 	 306 	 44 	 335 	 45
Very	 216 	 33 	 224 	 31 	 221 	 31 	 232 	 32
Total	 659 	 100 	 721 	 100 	 705 	 100 	 737 	 100
Islam	more	prone	to	violence	
(security	threat)
Yes	 200 	 30 	 303 	 42 	 301 	 42 	 393 	 53
No	 468 	 70 	 419 	 58 	 409 	 58 	 345 	 47
Total	 668 	 100 	 722 	 100 	 710 	 100 	 738 	 100
About half of the respondents in the Netherlands and 
Germany, 52 and 50 percent respectively, indicated that 
they had a negative opinion of Muslims. Significantly more 
positive were the British and French respondents, of whom 
83 and 67 percent respectively reported a (very) favour-
able opinion of Muslims (F(3, 2635) = 75.6, p < .001, η² = 
.08). The results indicate no clear relationship between the 
overall attitude towards Muslims and support for a ban on 
headscarves. In France and Germany, support for a ban on 
headscarves was more widespread than prejudice towards 
Muslims, whereas in the United Kingdom prejudice to-
wards Muslims was more widespread. Bivariate correlations 
show that people with a negative attitude towards Muslims 
were more likely to support a ban on headscarves, but the 
associations were weak (ρ < .30, Table 2). 
Table 2:  Spearman’s rho (ρ) correlation coefficients, with support for a 
ban on headscarves, by country 
Variable UK France Germany Netherlands
Negative	opinion		
of	Muslims		
(overall	attitude)
ρ .29*** .19*** .18*** .29***
N 580 709 630 716
Muslims	want		
to	remain	distinct	
(symbolic	threat)
ρ .17*** .11** .03 .22***
N 538 687 684 713
Concern	about	ex-
tremism	in	country	
(security	threat)
ρ .19*** .10** .17*** .14***
N 659 721 705 737
Islam	more	prone	to	
violence	
(security	threat)
ρ .11** .10* .12** .17***
N 668 722 710 738
***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01,	*	p	<	.05
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A majority of respondents in all four countries had the 
opinion that most Muslims prefer to remain distinct from 
the larger society, rather than adopting the country’s way 
of life. Nevertheless, analysis of variance showed that there 
were still medium-sized differences between all countries, 
with the German respondents most strongly endorsing this 
view (89 percent), followed by the British, the Dutch and 
finally the French (60 percent) (F(3, 2710) = 62.0, p < .001, η² 
= .06). The perception that Muslims want to remain distinct 
from the larger society was weakly associated with support 
for a ban on headscarves in the United Kingdom, France 
and the Netherlands (ρ < .22), while in Germany, this as-
sociation was not found. This could be explained in terms 
of the German historical practice of treating immigrants as 
a separate community and encouraging them to maintain 
their own culture and habits. On the other hand, the lack of 
association might also have a technical reason because there 
is little variation among German respondents. 
Around one third of the respondents in all four countries 
were very concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism 
in their country. Respondents in the United Kingdom were 
most divided in their opinion; here we found the highest 
percentage who were not concerned about extremism, as well 
as the highest percentage who were very concerned. However, 
the differences between the countries were marginal and not 
significant (F (3, 2932) = .38, p = .769). As expected, people 
who were more concerned about the rise of Islamic extrem-
ism were more likely to support a ban on headscarves, but the 
relation was very weak (ρ < .19). Lastly, more than half of the 
Dutch respondents had the opinion that Islam is more violent 
than other religions. In Germany and France 42 percent and 
in the United Kingdom three out of ten respondents indi-
cated that Islam is more violent than other religions. The dif-
ferences between the countries were small but significant (F 
(3, 2886) = 28.5, p < .001, η² = .03), except between Germany 
and France. People who perceived Islam as being more prone 
to violence were more likely to support a ban on headscarves, 
but the association was weak (ρ < .17). 
Although all associations were in the expected directions, 
they differed in strength across countries. The association be-
tween the overall attitude towards Muslims and support for 
a ban was weakest in Germany and was significantly weaker 
than the associations found in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. Further significant differences were found, be-
tween Germany compared to the United Kingdom and to the 
Netherlands, in the strength of the association between the 
perception that Muslims want to remain distinct and support 
for a ban on headscarves. These findings strengthen the ex-
pectation that a psychological explanation of public support 
depends on contextual and cross-national differences. 
4.2. Explaining Support for a Ban on Headscarves
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine 
the extent to which attitudes towards Muslims and threat 
perceptions explain support for a ban on headscarves in the 
different countries. Evaluation of the model for the individ-
ual countries shows that the explanatory model was a good 
fit for the data for all countries (Table 3). However, the ex-
tent to which the predictors contributed to correct classifi-
cation of supporters and opponents of a ban on headscarves 
varied across countries. Compared to the baseline model, in 
which no predictors were included, the ability of the model 
to predict whether a respondent supports or opposes a ban 
on headscarves increased by 14 percent for the Nether-
lands. The increase was, however, much lower in the other 
countries and at its minimum in France, where the predic-
tors added not even one percent to the correct prediction of 
support of a ban on headscarves. This means that in France 
the psychological factors in this model did not explain why 
a person supports a ban on headscarves. 
Table 3:  Logistic regression of support for a ban on headscarves: 
Model evaluation by country and pooled sample
UK France Germany
Nether-
lands
All
Likelihood	
ratio	test
χ² 63.1*** 39.5*** 53.5*** 88.8*** 447.3***
df 12 12 12 12 30
N 398 658 520 607 2174
Classification	
rate		
(percentages)	
·	Baseline 66.3 79.8 61.0 52.1 59.3
·	Countries 65.1
·	Predictors 72.2 80.2 66.9 65.9 70.1
***	p	<	.001	
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The differences in explanatory power between the countries 
can have different underlying causes. One possibility is that 
there are structural differences between countries in the effect 
that a predictor variable has on the dependent variable. For 
instance, the perception that most Muslims do not want to 
adopt the way of life of the country might be related to support 
for a ban on headscarves in some countries and not in others. 
To test this hypothesis, the country samples were pooled and 
dummy variables were included in the logistic regression 
analyses for the countries. Interactions between the countries 
and the predictor variables were included to test whether there 
were structural differences between the countries. The model 
had a good fit to the data (Table 3, last column) and results in 
a correct classification rate of 70 percent, meaning that for 70 
percent of the respondents the model could rightly predict 
whether they supported or opposed a ban. This is an increase 
of 11 percent compared to the baseline model. A substantial 
part of the increase is due to the inclusion of the countries. 
Table 4 shows that compared to the Dutch respondents, Ger-
mans are four times more likely to support a ban on heads-
carves, and the French nine times. The British were 1.5 times 
less likely than the Dutch to support a ban on headscarves, 
with an odds ratio of 0.63. The results shown for the predic-
tor variables (Table 4, top rows) are the main effects for the 
Netherlands (reference country). The main effects for the other 
countries can be obtained by adding the interaction effects 
(displayed under the respective countries) to the main effect of 
the reference category. 
The results are quite similar across countries. Among the 
psychological factors a negative attitude towards Muslims 
was the strongest predictor of support. In the Netherlands 
and France, a more negative attitude made it six times more 
likely that someone would support a ban on headscarves. In 
Germany and the United Kingdom, this effect was slightly 
weaker, but the differences between the countries were not 
significant. Significant differences did, however, exist with 
respect to the effect of the perception that Muslims prefer to 
remain distinct. This was the second most important predic-
tor for support for a ban on headscarves in the Netherlands, 
France and the United Kingdom; people who perceived that 
Muslims do not want to adopt the country’s way of life were 
almost twice as likely to support such a ban as respondents 
who did not have this opinion. This was different in Ger-
many: Germans who perceived that Muslims want to remain 
distinct were only half as likely (odds ratio is 0.46) to sup-
port a ban as Dutch respondents with the same opinion. The 
perception that Muslims want to remain distinct did thus not 
have a significant impact on support for a ban on headscarves 
in the German sample. This might, again, be attributed to 
German national practices. 
Dutch and German respondents who had the perception that 
Islam is more prone to violence than other religions were 1.5 
times more likely to support a ban on headscarves. This ef-
fect seemed to be weaker in France and the United Kingdom 
(odds ratios 0.65 and 0.64 respectively), but the differences 
between the countries were not significant. The seemingly 
weaker effects in France and the United Kingdom are in line 
with the expectation that in countries with strong secularist 
or multicultural traditions, perceptions of threat (high or low) 
are less relevant. 
Being “somewhat concerned” about the rise of Islamic ex-
tremism was chosen as the reference category for the logistic 
regression analysis. The question wording more or less stated 
that there has been a rise of Islamic extremism, and answering 
that one was not concerned might have been seen as inappro-
priate (even though, on average, one fourth of the respondents 
did indicate that they were not (or not at all) concerned about 
this). The results show that being very concerned or uncon-
cerned about the rise of Islamic extremism did not contribute 
to the explanation of support for a ban on headscarves. 
I hypothesised that there would be no differences between 
people with a positive or negative attitude towards Muslims 
with respect to the effect of the indicators of perceived threat 
on support for a ban on headscarves. Interactions between 
attitude towards Muslims and the indicators of perceived 
threat were included, but were very weak and not significant. 
This supports the expectation that perceptions of threat affect 
prejudiced and unprejudiced people alike in their tolerance 
judgements. 
The model was controlled for the effect of gender, age, educa-
tion and income, none of which showed a significant effect in 
any of the countries. 
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Table 4: Logistic regression of support for the ban on headscarves, pooled sample (N= 2174).
B (SE) Wald df Exp(B)
Constant -0.21 (.34) 36.53 1 0.13***
Negative	opinion	of	Muslims	(overall attitude) 1.86 (.39) 23.48 1 6.45***
Muslims	want	to	remain	distinct	(symbolic threat) 0.62 (.20) 9.86 1 1.87***
Concern	about	extremism	(security threat)
-	not	at	all	/	not	too	concerned	 0.01 (.22) 0.00 1 1.01
-	somewhat	concerned - - 3.24 2
-	very	concerned 0.36 (.21) 2.91 1 1.43
Islam	more	prone	to	violence	(security threat) 0.47 (.18) 6.69 1 1.59*
Netherlands	(reference	category) - -
Germany 1.42 (.44) 10.43 1 4.15***
x	negative	opinion	of	Muslims (overall attitude) -	0.52 (.56) 0.85 1 0.60
x	Muslims	want	to	remain	distinct	(symbolic threat) -	0.78 (.36) 4.69 1 0.46*
x	concern	about	extremism	(security threat)
x	not	at	all	/	not	too	concerned	 -0.39 (.33) 1.46 1 0.68
x	somewhat	concerned - - 1.48 2
x	very	concerned -0.08 (.31) 0.07 1 0.92
x	Islam	more	prone	to	violence	(security threat) -0.07 (.27) 0.06 1 0.94
United	Kingdom -0.46 (.45) 1.09 1 0.63
x	negative	opinion	of	Muslims	(overall attitude) 0.26 (.62) 0.18 1 1.30
x	Muslims	want	to	remain	distinct	(symbolic threat) -0.05 (.37) 0.02 1 0.96
x	concern	about	extremism	(security threat)
x	not	at	all	/	not	too	concerned	 -0.18 (.38) 0.22 1 0.84
x	somewhat	concerned - - 1.20 2
x	very	concerned 0.25 (.34) .54 1 1.29
x	Islam	more	prone	to	violence	(security threat) -0.44 (.31) 2.03 1 0.64
France 2.20 (.36) 38.24 1 8.99***
x	negative	opinion	of	Muslims	(overall attitude) -0.01 (.60) 0.00 1 0.99
x	Muslims	want	to	remain	distinct	(symbolic threat) -0.36 (.29) 1.57 1 0.70
x	concern	about	extremism	(security threat)
x	not	at	all	/	not	too	concerned	 -0.34 (.33) 1.08 1 0.71
x	somewhat	concerned - - 1.54 2
x	very	concerned -0.32 (.33) 1.00 1 0.72
x	Islam	more	prone	to	violence	(security threat) -0.44 (.28) 2.47 1 0.65
Note:	Model	is	controlled	for	gender,	age,	education	and	income.	None	of	the	control	variables	had	a	significant	effect.	
***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01,	*	p	<	.05
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5. Conclusion and Discussion
The results of this comparison of psychological explanations 
of public support for a ban on headscarves between the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
show differences in the mean levels of support between the 
countries. In accordance with what was expected on the ba-
sis of national traditions, support for a ban on headscarves 
was most widespread in France, which has a strict separa-
tion between religion and the state. Least support was found 
in the United Kingdom, the country with the strongest 
multicultural tradition. Germany and the Netherlands fall 
between these extremes. 
Explanations for the public support were based on the 
overall attitude towards Muslims, concern about Islamic ex-
tremism, the perception that Islam is a violent religion and 
the perception that Muslims prefer to remain distinct from 
the larger society, rather than adopting the customs and 
way of life of the country. The model proved to be a good 
fit to the data and increased the ability to predict support 
for and opposition to a ban on headscarves. A substantial 
part of this increase was due to controlling for the country 
of residence of the respondents. This again strengthens the 
case that contextual factors are important in explaining 
public support. 
It was hypothesized that there would be cross-national 
differences, not only in the mean levels of support, but also 
in the structure of the explanatory model. This was only 
partly confirmed; in Germany the perception that Muslims 
prefer to remain distinct was not related to support for the 
ban on headscarves, whereas it increased support in the 
other countries. This could be interpreted along the lines of 
the German tradition of perceiving immigrants as tempo-
rary and encouraging them to sustain their own culture 
(Brubaker 2001). Perhaps Germans do not perceive it as 
threatening when Muslims decline to adopt their customs 
and way of life. However, if that is the case, it might be seen 
as surprising that a majority (60 percent) is in favour of a 
ban on headscarves. Perhaps this is an indication of the 
shift towards assimilation that has taken place in Ger-
many since the 1990s (Brubaker 2001). The lack of effect 
in Germany could, however, also be the result of the lack 
of variation in the predictor variable; a large majority of 
the German respondents perceived that Muslims prefer to 
remain distinct. 
Another tendency in the results, although not statistically 
significant, was that the perception of Islam being more 
violent than other religions had a weaker effect in France 
and the United Kingdom than in Germany and the Neth-
erlands. Again, this can be interpreted as an indication that 
national traditions are important and shape the attitudes of 
the population. Individual perceptions of threat are of less 
importance when a country has a tradition of strict secular-
ism (France) or strong multiculturalism (United Kingdom). 
Although the results show that the explanatory models of 
the countries are largely similar, there are substantial differ-
ences between countries in the ability of the model to pre-
dict support for a ban on headscarves. In the Netherlands, 
the predictor variables increased this ability by 14 percent, 
whereas in France the increase was not even one percent. 
One explanation for this could be differences in the amount 
of variation within countries. When there is broad support 
for a ban on headscarves, as there was in France, there is 
not much variation that the model can explain, and thus the 
performance of the model will seem weaker. 
At the level of the individual it was hypothesized that sup-
port for a ban on headscarves was not limited to people 
with a negative attitude towards Muslims. The study shows 
that the freedom to wear headscarves in public places meets 
resistance among non-prejudiced people as well. In the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, approximately one-
fifth of the respondents had a positive opinion of Muslims 
yet supported a ban on headscarves; in Germany the figure 
was one quarter and in France half of the respondents. This 
challenges the assumption of tolerance research that the 
question of tolerating activities of others is relevant only 
for those with a prejudiced attitude (Marcus et al. 1995; 
Vogt 1997). In line with previous research (Van der Noll, 
Poppe, and Verkuyten 2010; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2007), this study shows that the perceptions that Islam is 
more violent than other religions and that Muslims want 
to remain distinct from the society – two arguments that 
are often used in the debates about headscarves (McGold-
rick 2006) – make it more likely that prejudiced and also 
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non-prejudiced people will support a ban on headscarves 
for Muslim women. There is a need for further research to 
examine when and under what conditions threat percep-
tions provoke exclusionary reactions. 
The variables used in this study suffer from severe limita-
tions and future studies could be improved by including 
better measures. The dependent variables measures support 
for “a ban on headscarves in public places”, which is a very 
broad and vague formulation. The debates and controver-
sies about the headscarf were more specific, for instance 
focused on schools, and it is very likely that support for a 
ban on headscarves is gradated, depending on the situa-
tion and the kind of headscarf, rather than a clear decision 
of supporting or opposing the idea of a complete ban on 
headscarves in public places. 
In addition, better measures of perceptions of threat would 
improve the study. As mentioned above, the perception 
that Muslims prefer to remain distinct does not refer to a 
threat per se, and it may even be encouraged by the majority 
population. The question addressing concern about Islamic 
extremism is also problematic, because it suggests that 
there is actually a rise of extremism. Although the results 
show that around one-fourth of the respondents did not feel 
concerned, people might have felt uncomfortable (uncon-
sciously perhaps) stating that they were not concerned. In 
future use, such items need to be carefully formulated. The 
measurement of the overall attitude towards Muslims is 
also limited and could be subject to social desirability. More 
subtle indicators to measure attitudes towards Muslims 
would be preferred. 
Contemporary theories on prejudice argue that old-
fashioned prejudice has given way to modern forms of 
racism and prejudice based on perceived conflicts of values 
(Sears and Henry 2003; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 
1993). Future studies on support for the rights and liber-
ties of Muslims would benefit from including measures of 
value orientations. Orientations such as universalism and 
multiculturalism or traditionalism and conformity could 
for instance at the level of the individual, as well as at the 
aggregated societal level, be an important predictor of sup-
port (Saroglou et al. 2009). In addition, discussions about 
the wearing of headscarves, and about Islam in general, are 
often focused on the position of women and value conflicts 
with respect to gender equality and patriarchy (Shadid 
and Van Koningsveld 2005; McGoldrick 2006). Including 
indicators that address these values and conflicts in the 
explanatory model could largely contribute to the explana-
tion of support for a ban on headscarves. Including value 
orientations in the explanatory model would furthermore 
allow us to test whether support for issues such as a ban on 
headscarves is mainly driven by prejudice, or stems from 
value orientations reflecting what the society should be 
like. 
Despite its limitations, the current study is one of the first 
to compare the level of support for one specific aspect of 
Muslims’ religious rights and to test an explanatory model 
across countries. The results of this study show that national 
contexts have a substantial influence on the tendency of the 
population to support a ban on headscarves. Furthermore, 
the results show that perceptions of threat posed by Islam 
and Muslims influence the tolerance judgements of both 
prejudiced and unprejudiced people. As long as the debate 
on headscarves is focused on threat and differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, the debate will harm rela-
tions between Muslims and non-Muslims. If, on the other 
hand, the focus of the debate were to shift to issues such as 
neutrality and non-discrimination, rather than Islamic ex-
tremism and rejection of western values, relations between 
Muslims and non-Muslims would not be that strongly af-
fected by the debate and could (actually) improve. 
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